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Introduction
 When reading Alice’s  Adventures  in Wonderland ,  the reader must 
consider the effects of how Carroll’s portrayal of beloved and famous—or 
infamous—characters like the Mad Hatter or the Cheshire Cat hinges on those 
characters’ explicit and labeled madness. By naming and including this playful 
idea of madness, Carroll entered a vibrant discourse during his era, when defining 
mental illness and disability was troublesome, and when people with mental 
illnesses were visible in both the public imagination and in the eyes of the state 
in ways they had rarely been before, due to the increase of asylums, diagnoses 
of mental illnesses and disabilities, and the attempt to legally categorize the 
main types of mental illness. As the episode with the Cheshire Cat briefly 
demonstrates,  Wonderland madness defied many of  the conceptions of 
madness that Victorian doctors formed; first because it could be applied to 
any and all characters and not only the characters labeled as mad, but also 
because it could be a positive and liberating, rather than a negative, force. 
 Carrol l ’s  depic t ion of  madness as def ined by seemingly contrary 
act ions,  rather than inherent medical or hereditary conditions, also speaks to 
the nuanced consequences of breaking from rationality and order, proposing 
that madness evokes either impotent danger or liberated imagination. In the 
novel, Carroll contrasts violent madness as a rebellion against enforced order 
 “But I  don’t want to go among mad people,” Alice remarked. 
 “Oh,  you  can ’ t  he lp  that ,”  sa id  the  Cat :  “we’re  a l l  mad here .  I ’m 
mad. You’re mad.” 
 “How do you know I’m mad?” said Alice.
 “You must be,” said the Cat,  “or you wouldn’t have come here.”
Alice  didn’t  think that  proved i t  a t  a l l ;  however,  she  went  on “And how 
do you know that you’re mad?” “To begin with,” said the Cat,  “a dog’s not 
mad. You grant that?” 
 “I suppose so,” said Alice.
 “Wel l ,  then ,”  the  Cat  went  on ,  “you see ,  a  dog  growls  when i t ’ s 
angry, and wags its tail  when it’s pleased. Now I growl when I’m pleased, 
and wag my tail  when I’m angry. Therefore I’m mad.” (Carroll  57)
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and social norms with peaceful—and essentially harmless—madness as a result 
of  freedom from those norms.  In doing so,  he crit iques the strict  order 
in Victorian society and its rejection of liminality and fluidity. The idea of 
madness that Carroll presents in his story is defined by playfulness, rebellion 
against norms, and linguistic creativity that defies social order. Ultimately, 
he uses madness as a means to critique the strict binaries and rigid social 
structures and hierarchies in Victorian society, including the delineation of 
“sane” and “insane.”
The Context of Wonderland: 
Asylum Spaces, Regulated Bodies, and Imagination
 Carroll wrote his novel in an era where questions surrounding the care, 
diagnosis, and treatment of mentally disabled individuals defined legislation, 
economic problems, and social codes. In his time, the discourse on the mentally 
ill stretched beyond those of psychology and medicine into the writings of authors 
like Dickens and Brontë. Part of what created this interest in mental health 
and disability that spanned disciplines was the newly prominent political 
problem of caring for disabled people who could not function in a capitalist 
society.  While  care  within the  family  and community  had exis ted for 
centuries ,  and hospitals such as Bethlehem, familiarly known as “Bedlam,” 
were established for mentally disabled people as early as the sixteenth and 
seventeenth centuries, the Victorian period saw an increase in the creation of 
asylums. Living standards for mentally disabled or mentally ill people rose 
within the spheres that either could afford to pay for this institutional care, 
or who were helped by wealthy and charitable donors, allowing mentally ill, 
mentally disabled, and physically disabled people treatment, if not increased 
liberties or rights. People could be and were forcibly committed to asylums, 
as the officials who examined them for mental illness had the final say as to their 
commitment, and once in the asylum could be imprisoned as securely as inmates in a 
prison—or even more so (Wright 268). 
 The asylum, then, was a place of treatment, not of freedom or care. But 
this increase in institutional treatment for people with mental disabilit ies also 
correlated with greater fears of the existence of potential disability in children. 
It is significant that before the creation of county asylums and private asylums, 
the most accessible care available to mentally ill or disabled people was care 
within the family, which often meant the mentally ill person was shutaway, 
whether literally or metaphorically, and kept out of the public eye (Wright 
114). The asylum, on the other hand, brought mentally ill and physically disabled 
individuals into the public eye in terms of community surveillance for mental 
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illness and disability, as county officials and doctors were then required to 
evaluate people for symptoms of mental illness or disability, and neighbors 
and community members were interviewed as a part of the evaluation (Wright 
117). As the asylum became an ever-more visible symbol of insanity present 
in the society, the debate over what caused mental illness and what could be 
defined as mental illness expanded past already existing disorders to certain 
socialdeviances, illegal behaviors, and habits that seemed illogical or fantastical. 
As a perhaps surprising result, there was a prominent discussion among 
psychologists as to whether children’s daydreaming and imagination could 
result in psychological disorders later in life.
Asylum Structure and Castle Building: 
The Effects on Children’s Play of Categorizing Insanity
 The issue of categorizing mental disabilities and mental illness was also a 
major concern and emphasis of the Victorian-era discourse surrounding mental illness. 
The rigid categories and definitions that arose from these concerns again reveal 
a rejection of fluidity and permeable boundaries, as legally these categories 
were used as labels that affected a person’s rights and employment, often 
ensuring a separation of “sane” and “insane” people. In the Lunatics Act of 
1845, three major subgroups of mental i l lness and mental disability were 
established: lunatics, idiots, and persons of unsound mind (Wright 16). An 
idiot was someone who, from birth, lacked the ability to reason. A lunatic was 
someone who sometimes could reason and sometimes could not. A person of 
unsound mind, however, was simply anyone who was “incapable of managing 
himself and his affairs” but was not a lunatic nor an idiot (Wright 16). These 
definitions clearly lack specificity. Although the three categories were defined 
as separate under the law, in practice there was little distinction made when 
asylums and other authorities decided who needed to be institutionalized. 
 The biggest factors for committing someone to an institution were 
whether that person was “dangerous,” often meaning violent, and whether that 
person was “curable,” meaning able to conform to societal norms. The idea of “castle 
building,” defined by Stephanie Schatz as a child’s  imagination building 
worlds or characters that do not exist, was considered a disorder by several prominent 
psychologists. “Castle building” is a lovely term that in many ways describes 
Alice’s journey to a fantastical land ruled by a monarchy, but also speaks to 
the fears of Victorian society surrounding imaginative play that superseded 
productive work. Victorian psychologists believed that if a child—any child, 
even one who had no prior mental condition—spent too much time daydreaming, 
mental impairments and an inability to distinguish reality from fantasy would 
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follow (Schatz 104).  To prevent this,  parents and other authorities like 
teachers were encouraged to ensure that children stayed too busy with work 
to daydream. 
 In the emphasis on productivity and the ability to function in a very specific 
way to fulfill gendered work roles, the specter of industrialized capitalist society 
rears its head. In lunatic asylums, mentally ill people might undergo some 
training for vocational work, but near the end of the nineteenth century, the 
assumption regarding mental illness was that mentally ill people could not be 
expected to work and instead had to be cared for by the society. Therefore, in the 
case of “castle building,” imagination and creativity in children t hreatened the 
development of a sane, neurotypical capitalist society in which members were 
expected to function in roles that were accepted as productive; the inability 
to function suggested by this pathological distraction was seen to destabilize 
and undermine the desired social order. 
 This concern explicitly reveals the fear of unexpected madness, as well 
as the fear of how prevalent and yet undetected mental illness could be. The 
asylum, whether designed for children or adults, was a tightly-regulated and 
often harsh space. The Earlswood Asylum, a facility for mentally disabled 
children in England, embodied the ideology of “moral architecture” common 
in asylum construction, where the very design of the space had to be as orderly 
and as coherent as possible so that the space in turn created order within the 
minds of the children inhabiting the asylum. In Earlswood, children attended lessons 
that included reading and writing skills, basic life skills, and social-behavioral skills. 
 A great deal of emphasis was also placed on controlling children’s physical 
bodies by “drilling” them, which involved repetitive physical routines meant 
to eliminate their physical tics and gestures (Wright 82). The theories that 
were common in creating the routines of these asylums viewed the mind as 
initially perfect and the body as the cause of the disorder, with both parts 
intrinsically linked; if the children’s physical tics could be cured, theorists 
believed, the mind would be cured as well. Vocational training, including 
teaching female patients to complete house keeping tasks and teaching male 
patients to do basic labor, was a major goal in order to both sustain the institution 
itself and to lessen the care the patients would need from their family once 
they were discharged. 
 The institution was meant to be an isolated, orderly, restrict ive space, 
allowing for both the control and the surveillance of the patients within; 
patients’ creative expressions, whether written, verbal, or physical, were 
f irmly l imited. But soon after the establishment of the Earlswood asylum, the 
purpose of asylums and the types of patients they admitted would once again 
change, as the conception of mental illness and disability expanded beyond 
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that of idiocy and lunacy. Hereditarianism, the idea that a family’s traits or 
background would determine the traits of their offspring, came to the forefront 
of psychological discussions. From the prominence of hereditarianism, conditions 
like alcoholism began to be considered mental disorders. As David Wright 
argues, “By placing social problems like alcoholism, prostitution, criminality, 
and pauperism on an equal footing with more recognized diseases, such as 
epilepsy and consumption, socially unacceptable behavior was legitimized as 
a medical category” (190).
 Because of this conflation of social behavior with disability, asylums 
became, to some extent, moralizing tools against the continuation of these sorts 
of social behaviors. The asylum heads’ goal became not to prepare mentally 
disabled children to function in abled society, but to ensure full control over 
“feebleminded” ch i ldren and adults  who came f rom famil ies  suspected of 
t hese sor ts  of  unacceptable behaviors or who participated in these behaviors. 
Mental disability at this point was then inescapably linked with defying 
standards of social acceptability, providing the basis for treating individuals 
who acted against social norms as having intrinsic “disorders.” 
 The places where Carroll’s historical context and his characters and 
locations of Wonderland overlap are many and varied. The architectural features 
of Wonderland often echo asylum features, while the outdoors of Wonderland 
represent a wilder space free from societal constraints. The “castle building” 
that Victorian child psychologists feared is l iterally encoded in Carroll’s 
monarchy, with the mad Queen and the Duchess revealing critiques of the 
pol it ical system and of the gendered hierarchies implic it  in both general 
Victorian society and Victorian mental health practices. Alice’s body exemplifies 
the experience of both physical disability and mental disability in its refusal to 
conform to societal norms and expectat ions in a variety of situations. 
 Finally, the temporal schema of Wonderland both mirrors the asylum 
experience of controlled and stalled t ime and crit iques Victorian t ime as a 
means of regulat ion of people’s bodies and minds. Ultimately, the presence 
of mental i l lness in Carroll’s text is not merely a comic relief in the midst 
of Alice’s frustrat ions, nor is it meant to be a thrilling hint of danger in the 
wild world of Wonderland. Rather, the idea of madness that Carroll presents 
in his story is defined by imagination, creative freedom, and agency within 
seemingly deviant bodies that defy social order, ultimately using madness to 
critique the unyielding binaries and structures of much of Victorian society, 
starting with the delineation of “sane” and “insane.”
Freeing and Impeding Environments: 
Wonderland’s Relationship to Alice’s Physical Transformations
 The organization of Wonderland itself contains a mixture of restrictive, 
hard-to-navigate spaces for which Alice must fit some standard size or body 
shape to explore as well as open, outside spaces in which Alice can wander freely. 
Alice’s ability or inability to enter or leave spaces such as the tiny doors or the 
suddenly too-big hallway speaks to an inability to cross borders and to transition 
between social and class spheres with ease. But it also reveals a contrast between the 
spaces that appear dictated by rules or norms—those of the houses, the hallways, 
and the doors in Wonderland—and the spaces that allow free-flowing movement 
in physical action, in language, and in social behaviors. 
 Carroll’s use of the human-made architecture as a means of confinement 
anticipates disability theory’s focus on the idea of society as a space intentionally 
exclusive to or disabling for an impaired individual. That is, modern disability 
theory uses the term “impairment” to describe the physical or mental condition 
that affects the individual. The term “disability” refers to the ways in which the 
person’s society causes the person’s impairment to impede their abilities, whether 
physical or mental, to function in the able-bodied society. 
 A disabled or impaired person’s limitations, then, are understood to come from 
the ways in which their society fails to accommodate their impairment, rather than the 
limitations stemming from some intrinsic flaw in the disabled person. In the areas that 
are dictated by social and bodily norms, Carroll’s phrasing and chosen emphasis of 
Alice’s thoughts on her body and her situation reveal an important perspective on 
monstrous and disabled bodies. Although her body grows and shrinks impossibly, and 
although at one point her neck becomes monstrously serpentine, when she does despair 
over her transformation, her despair is always focused on the ways in which the design 
of her surroundings impair or disable her ability to navigate her environment. This is 
a perspective that directly echoes modern disability theory, as articulated by theorists 
like David Mitchell, Sharon Snyder, and Tobin Siebers. This is not to suggest Carroll’s 
anachronistic knowledge of modern theories of disability and impairment, but rather to 
show an awareness of those distinctions long before those laws took effect. 
 Alice’s impairment caused by her physical size becomes evident with her 
entrance into Wonderland, when her initial navigation of the structures of Won-
derland is dependent on having a body correctly sized and abled. The first space 
that Alice enters in Wonder land after falling down the furnished hole is the 
“long, low hall, which was lit up by a row of lamps hanging from the roof” (Carroll 
16). The hall contains a series of doors, all of which are locked, leaving Alice 
trapped in the hallway. Although she finally finds a key that will fit in the smallest 
door,  she can only open the door,  not  exit  through it ,  because she herself 
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is physically too large. This hall way that Carroll uses as both Alice’s and the 
reader ’s introduction to Wonderland signifies the sort of rational, architectural 
order and architectural security that would have been familiar to Alice and the 
reader. The locked doors secure the space of the hallway by preventing anyone 
without a key to pass. 
 There is a correct process that Alice must follow if she wants to leave the 
hallway, which is to unlock the door and become the right size; the idea of 
changing one’s body to fit or pass into a space speaks to concerns about unwanted 
people entering restricted spheres. In this hallway, the locked doors prevent fluidity 
and create strict boundaries and clear thresholds, defining what is within the 
space of the hallway and what is not. It appears as a civilized, rational, ordered 
space. In Wonderland, then, this hallway is arguably the closest representation 
of the architecture of Alice’s world; it is also perhaps the closest representation 
of the structure of an asylum. Many asylums had wards separated by doors that 
could be locked from the outside to prevent the movement of patients. The movement in 
the hallway was restricted by the control of the doctors and nurses. This hallway 
that Alice first encounters echoes the architectural organization of an asylum. 
However, here in this hallway, Alice is not yet in the “madhouse,” but rather is 
in a liminal space that bars her from the unstructured, illogical world of Wonderland. 
The hallway, then, along with other examples of human architecture, like the 
White Rabbit’s house, operates as one of the clearest architectural symbols of 
social order and control within Wonderland.
 The symbol of human-made structures as methods of physical and emotional 
confinement continues when Alice enters the White Rabbit’s house, as Carroll links 
Alice’s discomfort with the design of the house itself and not with Alice’s growing body. 
In the White Rabbit’s house, Alice’s transformation is cause for alarm, as her body 
outgrows the space of the home: “She put one arm out of the window, and one foot up 
the chimney . . . it was very uncomfortable, and, as there seemed to be no sort of chance 
of her ever getting out of the room again, no wonder she felt unhappy” (Carroll 
44). Alice’s growth works as a metaphor of social transgression, as her body physically 
exceeds the threshold of the room, with her arm out the window and her foot in the 
chimney. However, the significant aspect of this passage is that Alice’s unhappiness is 
caused by the tightness of the room and her inability to leave the room, not by her 
enlarged body. Carroll locates Alice’s discomfort within the space itself, so the blame for 
Alice’s physical impairment is placed on the space and that which the space represents: 
the society that designed it. 
 In clear contrast to the controlled space of the hallway is the open and free space 
of the outdoors in Wonderland. When Alice enters the wood for the first time, meeting 
in quick succession the Caterpillar and the Pigeon, she is able to move about the wood 
freely, without the physical restriction that both the hallway and the White Rabbit’s 
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house placed on her. Part of the liberation that the wood offers is its few clear boundaries; 
the grass around the houses turns into the wood quickly, and the wood is left behind 
just as quickly when Alice finds a new house. Her body’s changes are also far easier 
in the wood in the sense that although Alice’s suddenly huge height alarms her, she is 
not trapped as she was in the White Rabbit’s house, nor is she seeking an exact size or 
shape as she was when she sought to go out the tiny door. This new freedom 
is exemplified through Alice’s transformation and reaction: “As there seemed to be no 
chance of getting her hands up to her head, she tried to get her head down to them, and 
was delighted to find that her neck would bend about easily in any direction, like a 
serpent” (Carroll 62). In contrast to Alice’s fear of growing too large while in the confines 
of the Rabbit’s home, in the wood her transformation is cause for delight, because she 
has no physical barriers that would entrap her body and cause her physical discomfort.
 We see again that in the wood, her fear about her body’s changes came 
more from the structures around her impeding and imprisoning her movement 
rather than any fear of her body itself. Where her enlarged body was a problem, 
her serpent neck is a wonder; she plays with it, making it “bend about easily in 
any direction” (Carroll 62). Here Alice is not trying to conceal or cure her serpent 
neck, but instead finds enjoyment in what could be considered physical deviancy. 
Alice becomes further deviant here in playing with her own body, an act that 
goes beyond Victorian ideals of girlhood that portrayed the girl-child as angelic, 
almost beyond physicality (Leach 59). 
 The interaction between Alice and her own body constitutes an exploration 
of physicality beyond what would be socially acceptable. The wood, a place of 
far more freedom and far more fluidity than the hallway or the house thus becomes 
part of the “madhouse,” a place where monstrous and disabled bodies are considered 
delightful rather than fearsome, a place where bodily norms are ignored, which the 
hallway, with all its locked doors and controlling of movement, appears to guard 
against. Where the asylum controls bodies and regulates movement, the madhouse 
frees its inhabitants from such impediments.
 However, this is not to say that Carroll creates a binary in Wonderland between 
“sane” spaces like the White Rabbit’s house and “insane” spaces like the Hatter and 
March Hare’s tea table. Throughout the novel, Carroll strives to avoid creating clear-cut 
separation between any potentially binary ideas. Instead, there is deliberate, obvious 
slippage between the physically and architecturally “sane” spaces and the “insane” 
spaces. When Alice finds a door in a tree upon leaving the Hatter and the March 
Hare’s tea party, she finds herself led directly back into the hallways of locked doors. 
In this transition between two spaces that seem in direct opposition to each other, the 
placement of this door in the middle of the tree is remarkable because it demonstrates 
a breaking down of what should be rigid barriers between the mad house of the tea 
party space and the rationality of the hallway. 
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 The tea party space she has come from contains a house where “chimneys 
were shaped like ears, and the roof was thatched with fur” (Carroll 76); a table 
whose occupants seems to exist out of time and who employ deliberately illogical 
linguistic tricks; and the deliberate destabilization of symbols of order, like that 
of table etiquette. But the hallway of locked doors that she enters is arguably 
one of the spaces most restricted and contained by social order, as it represents the 
restriction of fluidity and of liminality; there can be no threshold because most of 
the doors cannot be opened. Carroll emphasizes this by showing that once Alice 
is back in this hall, away from the free space of the Hatter ’s house, the first 
action she has to undertake is “taking the little golden key, and unlocking the 
door that led into the garden” (Carroll 77). As a result, the hall appears tightly controlled 
and logically shaped, with defined rules and patterns for moving in and out of 
the space, in contrast to the creative architecture of the animalistic home of the 
Hatter. The door between these places is not in an expected or rational setting, 
like at the entrance to a house, but instead is in a tree. 
 Carroll demonstrates to the reader that the door ’s location is meant to be 
odd through Alice’s remark of “That’s very curious!” (Carroll 87).Thus Carroll 
reveals his linkage of things or ideas that seem in opposition to one another, in 
order to break binaries like “sane” and “insane” that appear impermeable. Because 
Alice is able to move easily between the supposed binaries of “sane” and “insane,” 
Carroll ultimately challenges these supposed oppositions. Finally, Carroll’s 
complication of the relationship between the “sane” and “insane” spaces as not 
in opposition, but in connection, to each other, offers a clear rebuttal to the norms 
of Victorian mental health in restricting and regulating displays of emotion when 
Alice’s tears become the vehicle through which she is able to leave the hallway. 
In the scene in which Alice, too large to fit comfortably in the hallway, begins to 
cry, the discussion Alice has with herself exemplifies for the reader the socially 
acceptable Victorian response and attitude towards displays of emotion: “‘You 
ought to be ashamed of yourself,’ said Alice, ‘a great girl like you . . . to go on crying 
in this way! Stop this moment, I tell you!’” (Carroll 23). 
 In shaming herself for crying, Alice takes on the role of an adult or a doctor 
as well as the role of the patient. As Victorian women could be diagnosed as mentally ill 
with the condition of hysteria, a condition where the woman was believed to be 
too outwardly emotional, Alice’s reaction to tell herself to stop shows that she 
recognizes her display of emotion as unacceptable, either socially or medically, just 
as a Victorian doctor would (Shutt leworth 27).  She has internal ized the 
gendered norms of her society regarding emotion, believing that a woman’s 
tears are evidence of something shameful. Emphasizing this internalization of 
gendered norms, Carroll again makes Alice’s negative view of her emotional 
outburst clear when she says, “‘I shall be punished for [crying] now, I suppose, 
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by being drowned in my own tears!” (Carroll 28). Alice’s expectation of capital 
punishment for crying reveals her extremely of the negative view of excessive 
emotion that she holds. In what she understands about the consequences of displays 
of emotions, crying can be punished with death, thereby revealing her society’s 
absolute and brutal consequences for failing to conform to societal norms.
 Carroll quickly refutes the perspective that excessive emotions deserve 
punishment; although Alice expects to be “drowned in [her] own tears,” the consequence 
of her crying is in fact the opposite of what she expected, as her tears float her to her 
liberation from the hallway. Implicit in this escape is a subversion of Victorian social 
and emotional norms, as Alice’s freedom, when it comes, is not gained through using 
the correct procedure that the placement of the key and the locked doors imply is 
needed. To leave the hallway while following the acceptable social procedure for 
both regular Victorian society and Victorian asylums would have required Alice to 
stifle her emotions, control her body so that it fit the door, and use the key. 
 In asylums especially, exit from the asylum was granted only when a patient 
had either recovered or been ”cured” enough to function according to social 
norms and etiquette (Wright 163). A “cured” patient would not cry and create a 
pool of tears. By employing Alice’s tears as the means for her to free herself from 
the space controlled by social norms, Carroll refutes Alice’s belief that emotions 
should be restrained and instead presents a perspective of excessive emotions—
which could be and were considered symptoms of mental illness, especially in 
women and girls—as a liberating force. 
Carroll Interrogates Social Insanity: 
The Rebellious Women of Wonderland
 The majority of the people and creatures that Alice encounters are male, but 
her encounters with other females are telling. One such interaction is with the Duchess, 
a bad-tempered member of the King and Queen of Hearts’ court. Although the Duchess’ 
first appearance makes her seem inexplicably and incurably violent, her final scene 
demonstrates how liberation from societal norms ends the seemingly insane violence 
against the society that enforces the norms, thereby defying the hereditarian ideals of 
Victorian medicine that would have named the Duchess’ mind and body as the source 
of her violence. In the scene in which the Duchess is introduced, Carroll focuses on 
creating a dysfunctional and violent burlesque of a domestic setting, parodying the 
traditional role of a woman in the household and subverting the trope of a woman 
as mother to depict how enforced social norms lead to her rebellion, enacted through 
violent madness. 
 The Duchess in the private sphere of her home mirrors the violence of the 
Queen of Hearts; she is the only character besides the Queen herself to order Alice’s 
head chopped off. When Alice first meets the Duchess, the Duchess is defined as a 
head chopped off. When Alice first meets the Duchess, the Duchess is defined as a 
woman who cannot control her own household; the cooking has gone wrong, the 
cook is violently throwing pots and pans at the Duchess and the baby, and the entire 
house is in chaos. Furthermore, the Duchess’ violence is depicted in this private 
setting of the home, where a Victorian woman should be gentle and nurturing: the 
ideal of a good mother. But in the scene, the Duchess, as she sings a song about beating 
the baby, keeps “tossing the baby violently up and down” (Carroll 71). In this setting, 
the Duchess’ violence towards her own child is contrasted with Alice’s concern for 
the baby, as Alice’s reaction to the baby being put in danger reveals. “‘Oh, please 
mind what you’re doing!’ cried Alice, jumping up and down in an agony of terror. 
‘Oh, there goes his precious nose’” (Carroll 70). The irony in this situation is that the 
child is deeply concerned about her fellow child, while the adult cares nothing for the 
safety of the baby; the child Alice becomes the figure of responsibility in this scene, 
inverting the normal schema for rationality that would have an adult as the rational 
figure, rather than a child. In demonstrating Alice’s care towards the child, Carroll 
matures Alice and simultaneously reduces the Duchess to a child-like, self-centered 
state through depicting her carelessness. 
 This has serious implications for the state of the Duchess’ presumed sanity; 
if she is functioning as more of a child than the literal children in the scene, Victorian 
psychology would consider her mentally ill. The Duchess also lacks compassion for 
the baby throughout this scene, ignoring its crying and in fact likely spurring on 
the baby’s misery; the Duchess is essentially a caricature of a motherly figure. She 
seems to have no knowledge of how to either care for her child or run her household, 
designating her as unfit for those adult responsibilities. She becomes even more of a 
mockery of a mother when Alice takes the baby, and the baby turns out to be a pig. 
Carroll thus uses this discovery of the supposed baby’s real form to reveal that the 
domestic structure as it stands corrupts both the mother and the children. 
 It is when the Duchess is freed from the space in which she must exercise 
the most responsibility and obedience to duty—her home—that she becomes a far 
gentler person and loses the violent form of madness that had defined her in Alice’s 
first meeting with her. In fact, once she leaves her home and meets Alice out on the 
croquet lawn, the form her madness takes most closely echoes that of the Mad Hatter 
and the March Hare, in which the madness is displayed by confusing and illogical 
statements rather than extreme passions or violence. When Alice meets the Duchess 
once more, the very first thing the Duchess says to her is, “You can’t think how glad I 
am to see you again, you dear old thing” (Carroll 103). Considering her actions in the 
first scene with Alice were to order Alice’s head chopped off, abuse the pig-baby, and 
brusquely abandon her child with Alice, this opening line of their reunion initially 
seems deeply out of character for the Duchess.  
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 But in this location, the Duchess appears to have found a greater amount 
of freedom. There is no pig-baby to be nursed, no furious cook throwing pots and 
pans, and no pepper infesting the air—essentially, there are no symbols of domesticity or 
motherhood surrounding the Duchess at this point. Her violence seems to be directly 
linked with the domestic sphere, a fact Alice considers as she muses about pepper as 
the cause of the Duchess’ original rage. So the madness both the Duchess and the 
cook display through wild violence towards symbols of domestic responsibility—a 
baby and cooking pots, respectively—can be read as rage directed towards the 
gendered social responsibilities that both are trapped by. It is the social structure that 
has created their madness, not any inherent qualities within either individual.
 To judge from the Duchess’ cessation of violence, then, Carroll’s suggestion for 
calming such wild passions that operate as a rejection of and reaction to social roles 
appears to be the opposite of what Victorian physicians would have recommended 
for violent, mentally ill people. The Victorian treatment, exemplified in the rituals 
of the Earlswood Asylum and in the general textbooks for treating violent hysteria, 
would include some form of control and ritual over the patient’s actions and body, 
with the ultimate goal to be to train the mentally ill person to function in society. But 
in Carroll’s text, the Duchess seems far more functional—and far less dangerous—
when she leaves the sphere of routine and responsibility symbolized in her home in 
favor of playing croquet outside on the lawn. Outside, she lacks the power and the 
expectations that come with the power of the home, but is ultimately happier and far 
less destructive as a result. The outside world appears to be governed by far fewer 
domestic rules or social norms than the house; the Duchess is still defined by her 
class, but is otherwise allowed to exist outside of her responsibilities. She tells Alice 
a series of morals—all of which may be illogical and nonsensical, but not nearly as 
harmful as beating a baby or threatening to chop off a child’s head. 
 But this explication of environment as the cause of the Duchess’s madness 
actually attacks the Victorian notion of hereditarianism, which defined mental or 
physical conditions as inherent to the person and often tied to that person’s family 
history and social status, or lack thereof. Carroll sets up the Duchess to appear as the 
product of hereditary factors from his description of her body as less than perfect: 
“the Duchess was very ugly” and “she was exactly the right height to rest her chin 
upon Alice’s shoulder, and it was an uncomfortably sharp chin” (Carroll 
103). However, he ultimately refutes hereditarianism as the cause of the Duchess’ 
mad behavior because he shows her behavior to be linked to her environment and 
not her body. That the Duchess is far less dangerous when allowed to escape her 
constrictive responsibilities reveals Carroll’s argument against the strict regulations 
that Victorian society favored for both mentally ill and neurotypical individuals.
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Conclusion
 Although the madness present in Wonderland appears at first only a humorous 
device meant to shock and amuse the reader, Carroll’s parallels between his mad 
world and his real world of Victorian England critiques the political and social constructs 
of his society and defends the creative nonsense and breaking of binaries and 
hierarchies that his characters and structures create. Under the veneer of humorous 
madness lies the critiques of asylum culture, of social norms that exclude disabled 
bodies and minds, and of gendered class and social structures, themes that appear 
both in Carroll’s text and in the psychological and medical discourses of Carroll’s 
time. The idea of castle building connects to Carroll’s fantastic monarchy; the idea 
of asylum discipline and control connects to Carroll’s portrayals of Alice’s body; 
and the conception of mental illness and disability as socially created connects 
to Alice’s mental and physical struggles to navigate socially constructed situations 
and spaces. Brought together, these deliberate connections shape Carroll’s critique of 
Victorian institutions for and concepts of mental illness. Carroll’s story, although meant 
for Victorian readers, resonates with many of the struggles that disability activists face 
today, in fighting for disability benefits, in fighting for the inclusion of disabled 
people in political and social spheres, and in critiquing a society built for able-bodied 
and able-minded people. Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland is thus a text that resonates 
across eras, and speaks to both the progress and stagnation of attitudes towards 
disability and mental illness.
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